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This paper investigates the current status of Information System Security (ISS) within New South Wales State government 
agencies in Australia. A 3-year longitudinal survey was used to increase awareness and motivate ISS managers. In addition, 
the survey was used as a management tool to monitor compliance with ISS standard’s controls (AS/NZS17799:2001). In 
2004 an amendment to the standard added critical success factors (CSFs) as being necessary for an agency’s movement to 
accreditation. An analysis of the CSFs results was undertaken to determine the status of an independently acting agency’s 
security readiness and they were summarized to then provide an overall measure. This measure provided a ‘benchmark’ for 
an agency’s security readiness to the standard’s CSFs (AS/NZS17799:2004.AMDT). While the process for improving 
security based on CSFs is adequate, actual improvement in ISS across government requires further effort. This research 
contributes to the level of understanding of ISS compliance within e-Government. 
Keywords
E-Government, e-Commerce, Information Systems Security (ISS), Longitudinal Survey, de jure ISS standards, International 
Standards Organization (ISO), ISS standard AS/NZS17799:2004.AMDT (ISO 27001), Critical Success Factors (CSFs).
INTRODUCTION
For business and government, the Internet has provided a seamless communication channel between organizations and 
customers, which is independent of time and geographic boundaries (Greenfield and Campbell, 2004; Quelch and Klein, 
1996). However, in recent times growth of electronic data interchange (EDI) in Australia has been slower than expected 
(C&L, 1994; Cullen, 1995), partly due to a number of risks and barriers, incorporating technological, security, control, legal 
and organizational issues (Cullen, 1995). E-Government has been defined as “the use of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) to improve the activities of public sector organizations” (Heeks, 2002, p3).
Government information repositories are an important resource that should be secure. Information should be protected at the 
whole-of-government (WoG) and individual agency level. It is clear that where the public is involved in transacting 
electronically with government, public confidence is essential to ensure the future viability of these services. Cost savings are
a major driving factor towards an increasing amount of electronic services, especially as the government is moving towards 
greater efficiency within the public service (and scrutiny via 4-year election cycle). 
Information Systems Security (ISS) is an essential part of ensuring public confidence in government and refers to: [The] 
protection of information systems against unauthorized access to or modification of information, whether in storage, 
processing or transit, and against the denial of service to authorized users, including those measures necessary to detect, 
document, and counter such threats (http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/projects/dev glossary/_information_systems_security.html).
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The aim of this research is to understand IS Security compliance across New South Wales (NSW) state government agencies
and also to measure this compliance. The NSW government is the largest state government in Australia by population, 
government agency full-time employees (FTEs) and revenue. Based on government agency FTEs, the NSW state government 
is also one of largest (non-national or non-Federal) governments in the Asia-Pacific region, similar in size to Washington or 
Arizona State in the United States (US) or Ontario and Quebec provinces in Canada. It is larger than most governed counties 
in the United Kingdom (UK), government metropolitan regions in France, states in Germany, or prefectures in Japan.  Due to 
its size and relationship to NSW citizens ISS compliance is an important factor in its operations.
The plan of our paper is as follows. The next section reviews the literature. The third section introduces the background to the 
study. The fourth section explains the methodology and the fifth section discusses the results. The sixth section concludes and 
gives suggestions for further research. The final section looks at implications and limitations. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Current ISS management literature is well documented, with many ISS management strategies, technologies, frameworks and 
methodologies having been developed. Kadam (2007, p. 246) posits that “the development of the information security policy 
is a critical activity”. An information security policy should be selected on appropriate control objectives that need to be 
achieved based on the requirements of the organization (Kadam, 2007). The objectives can be taken from a standard such as 
International Standards Organization, ISO 27001, a framework or code such as ISO 17799, Control Objectives for 
Information and related Technology (COBIT), legislation such as the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996 (HIPAA), the European Union Data Protection Act (1998) or recommendations based on an accord like Basel II 
(Kadam, 2007). Most of this research, however, focuses on e-Commerce implementation or on the technical issues of 
information system security (Backhouse and Dhillon, 2001). There is very little research in the e-Government domain and 
research into ISS as a whole is still in its infancy (Sharman, Rao and Upadhyay, 2004). While the literature indicates a 
predominately ‘positivist’ viewpoint, there is a trend to move away from a technical context to a wider scope for information 
security management (refer Backhouse and Dhillon, 2001; Siponen and Willison, 2007). This move has assisted in providing 
a more diverse understanding of information security management and guides research to develop better methods for the 
management of information security (see, for example, Siponen, 2005a, 2005b; Siponen and Iivari, 2006). 
“Standards (de jure) are fundamental compatibility specifications that shape the configuration of information systems” 
(Backhouse, Hsu and Silva, 2006, p.413). Von Solms (1999) examines information security management in the context of 
businesses having to comply with a standard (British Standard, BS 7799) before other organizations allow them to supply 
goods to their network. Smith (2005), Smith, Bunker and Pang (2006), Smith and Jamieson (2006), and Smith, Jamieson and 
Winchester (2007) examine ISS standards in an e-Government context using action research methodology. De jure standards 
are often updated periodically to reflect the changing nature of the underlying environment and ISS standards have had 
updates to keep up with ISS innovations (for an illustration of ISS standard development over time (and regions), see 
Backhouse et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2006). This review clearly indicates the two major gaps in the literature, namely the lack 
of research into Information Security Management and into e-Government, especially in the intersection of the two domains.
BACKGROUND TO STUDY
The NSW government endorsed a strategy called the ‘Shared Corporate Services Strategy’ (SCS) to improve the delivery of 
corporate services, realize the full potential and benefits IS/IT technologies and to reduce costs. The purpose of this strategy
was to provide a consistent standard approach to government services. The Office of Information and Communication 
Technology (OICT, 2001) recognize two security standards (and their updated standards) in the ICT area:
• ‘Common Core Criteria’ (ISO 15048) – this standard outlines engineering processes for developing software or hardware 
related to ICT security products; and
• ‘Information security management’ (Australia Standard/New Zealand Standard, AS/NZS4444:1999) – specification for 
information security management systems. It should be noted that this standard has been superseded by 
AS/NZS17799.1:2001, which was amended in AS/NZS17799.1:2004 AMDT (amendment).
The NSW Government adopted the AS/NZS17799.1:2001 (and amendment) standard as the minimum level for their agencies 
to achieve. Agencies were required to achieve compliance to this standard within three years to ensure a consistent approach 
to information security. The number of NSW government agencies varied from the first survey in 2002 to the 2004 survey 
because of changes in the structure of government, e.g., agencies can merge together (2 into 1), and new agencies can be 
created. The number of fully funded agencies classified as budget dependent in 2002 was 71. We group the agencies by size 
using full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) where the cutoffs for the groups are shown in Table 1, for large (>1,000 FTEs), 
medium (350-1,000 FTEs) and small (<350 FTEs) groups.
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Agency Group Size Cut-offs – (Full-time Equivalent, 
FTE, staff per agency)
Range (minimum to maximum) and Mean (FTE) 
within Size Groups 
Large >1,000 FTE = 18 agencies in the 
                      large group
Range: 1,285 to 86,541 FTEs
Mean agency size = 14,295 FTEs
Medium 350 - 1,000 FTE = 12 agencies Range: 385 to 933
Mean agency size = 627
Small Small:  < 350 FTE = 41 agencies Range: 11 to 346
Mean agency size = 124
Table 1. The Distribution of Budget Dependent Agencies by Staff Numbers (FTEs).
Previous research investigated ISS in Australia, through the analysis of the ten (10) categories outlined in Table 2 of Security 
Standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001 (refer, Smith et al., 2007). 
Key AS/NZS/ISO17799 Control Categories for Information Security
1. Security Policies
2. Security Organization
3. Asset Classification & Control
4. Personnel Security
5. Physical / Environmental Security
6. Computer & Network Mgt.
7. Systems Development & Maintenance
8. System Access Control
9. Business Continuity Planning
10. IS Policy Compliance
Table 2. Ten Control Categories from the Security Standard
This paper diverges from Smith, Jamieson and Winchester (2007) and investigates ISS from the perspective of critical 
success factors (CSFs) within the amended standard AS/NZS17799.1:2004/AMDT which are shown in Table 3.
Critical Success Factors (AS/NZS17799.1:2004/AMDT p.5)
1. Security policy, objectives and activities that reflect business objectives
2. An approach to implementing security that is consistent with the organizational culture
3. Visible support and commitment from management
4. A good understanding of the security requirements, risk assessment and risk management
5. Effective marketing of security to all managers and employees
6. Distribution of guidance on information security policy and standards to all employees and contractors
7. Providing appropriate training and education
8. A comprehensive and balanced system of measurement, which is used to evaluate performance in information security 
management and feedback suggestions for improvement.
Table 3. Critical Success Factors from AS/NZS17799.1:2004/AMDT
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As a result the research question we seek to answer is as follows:
“What is the current status of information system security based on Australian standard AS/NZS17799.1:2004.AMDT (now 
International Standard Organization, ISO 27001) critical success factors within New South Wales state government 
agencies”?
METHODOLOGY
The research question seeks to identify factors that can help provide common system’s procedures and controls to improve 
the level of ISS across agencies. The issues identified in the research question and survey questionnaire are based on 
principles and structures of the NSW state government.
The objective of ISS is to preserve and secure an agency’s information repository and the business systems and processes that 
support them in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
From a review of the published literature, it was expected that security methodologies and frameworks like the Australian 
standard AS/NZS17799.1:2004.AMDT would be well established within organizations, however, this does not appear to be 
the case. This study seeks to fill this gap. The study as presented here involved the development of a survey instrument 
(Newsted, Huff and Munro, 1998), grounded in the established security body of knowledge. This instrument was then applied 
to a test group and resulting data was reduced using descriptive statistical analysis. 
Information systems (IS) researchers have previously used interviews to gain insight (Fontana and Frey, 1994) and surveys as 
a tool to acquire ISS data for management ISS investment decisions (Straub, 1990), and to analyze various types of computer 
and internet attacks (Bagchi and Udo, 2003; Hinde, 2002; Thompson, 1998) and abuse (Baskerville, 1993). For IS 
researchers who carry out their own surveys (as opposed to using secondary survey data) the IS literature sets out methods 
that should be followed to validate instruments (e.g., Straub, 1989) and to maintain research rigor. Other IS researchers have 
based their survey questions on specific areas within the policy documentation of government, and/or from within ISO 
standards (Smith, 2005; Smith, Bunker and Pang, 2006; Smith and Jamieson, 2006; Smith, Jamieson and Winchester, 2007).
To monitor this process of an agency achieving compliance to the AS/NZS17799.1:2004.AMDT standard, the survey was 
placed online and agencies were requested to complete it at regular intervals to measure their progress. The first online 
security survey was in November 2001. Seven surveys in all were completed (see Table 4, for survey dates) only six looking 
at CSFs with the first survey being a pilot study. The survey contained 85 questions, taking over 30 minutes to complete plus 
the time it would take to collect and consolidate the agency data for the survey questions. Between surveys, interviews and 
forums also took place to gain feedback from ISS managers. Relevant survey feedback from both interviews and a forum 
added data comprehensiveness to the survey cycle. The main focus of this study is the online security surveys analysis. 
Additional government agency information (e.g., FTEs) was obtained from annual reports, reports, publication, and their 
website(s).
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (SECURITY STANDARD AS/NZS17799.1:2004.AMDT)
The survey data was analyzed against each of the ISS CSFs.
Security policy, objectives and activities that reflect business objectives
This factor was directed at the government agency level. The achievement of this factor was demonstrated by 41 agencies in 
2004 having a security policy, which equates to 36% compliance. The security policy states the objectives of security 
compliance within the business environment, and the security plan spells out the activities, which need to be undertaken. The 
number of agencies with a security plan in 2004 was 24, which represent 21% of agencies (based on the 113 responses to this 
question).
An approach to implementing security that is consistent with the organizational culture
This factor was directed at the Whole of Government (WoG) level. The entire project represents a consistent approach to 
security across government. It began with the first Premier’s Circular PC2001-46 in April 2001 and is still ongoing. The 
Premier’s Circular is an instruction issued by the head of state government agencies CEO’s requiring them to implement 
specific policy and procedures within their administration. The WoG strategy was mandated for all agencies to achieve 
certification by December 2004 although the deadline was moved to December 2006. 
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Visible support and commitment from management
This factor was directed at the government agency level. The compliance to this success factor was demonstrated by 131 
agencies attempting the on-line security survey and only eight (8) agencies made no attempt to complete in 2004. This meant
that the majority of agencies have some form of management commitment to improving security within their agency.
This CSF of ‘management support and commitment’ is addressed in two previously discussed issues namely: 
• Category 1 - Security Policies - The achievement of this factor is measured by 39 chief executive officer’s (CEO’s) signing 
off the 73 agency security policies in 2004, which equates to 53% (i.e., 39/73) support and commitment by senior 
management.
• Category 2 - Security Organization - Allocation of an ISS Managers - the achievement of this factor is measured by the 
increasing support of CEO’s from 46.3% (i.e., 37 ‘yes’ responses from 80 agencies which answered the question) of 
agencies in 2001 with an ISS manager to 79.5% (i.e., 89 ‘yes’ responses from 112 agencies which answered the question) 
in 2004 which means considerable support and commitment from senior management.
A good understanding of the security requirements, risk assessment and risk management
This factor was directed at the government agency level. The achievement of this factor is demonstrated by the majority of 
agencies identifying risks within their agencies (for business continuity planning, BCP and e-Commerce) and rating the 
assessment level in 2004 as demonstrated on the graph in Figure 1. The results in Figure 1 show an even distribution of risk 
with the exception of the majority of agencies having a low assessment for their e-Commerce systems and medium risk for 
their risk assessment of BCP within the agency. 








Low 2 3 Medium 5 6 High
How do you rate the level of risk
assessment used in the development of
the BCP
How would you rate the level of risk in
your E-commerce systems
Smith et al.,                                                                                       Moving Towards IS Security Accreditation within Government Agencies
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Toronto, ON, Canada August 14th-17th 2008 6
Figure 2: Agency Risk Assessment for e-Commerce systems
Figure 3. Rating of the level of security for e-Commerce systems
Figures 2 and 3 plot the mean of these measures. Briefly, the analysis of the means suggests for both figures that the medium 
sized agencies show a slightly higher risk to e-Commerce systems and a slightly higher security level than small and large 
agencies. The level of risk is measured using a Likert scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high). A full analysis of Figures 2 and 3 and 
the interaction between the measures is beyond the scope of this research paper but should be followed-up in any future 
research. Table 4 shows the level of risk e-Commerce systems and the level of security for those systems across the six (6) 









c om b in ed 2 .3 5 2 .33 2 .39 2 .46 2 .35
s m a ll 2 .5 8 2 .33 2 .28 2 .28 2 .17
m e d ium 2 .1 8 2 .46 2 .38 2 .63 2 .33
la rge 2 .6 7 2 .20 2 .76 2 .94 3 .00










c om bined 3.18 2.92 2.78 2.88 2.78
s m all 2.81 2.76 2.52 2.61 2.56
m edium 3.18 3.69 3.29 3.47 3.00
large 3.00 2.70 3.24 3.33 3.37
A pr_02 A ug_02 Nov_02 Nov_03 N ov_04
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Table 4. Agency Risk and Security Assessments
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Agency 
Group
Agency Risk Assessment for 
e-Commerce systems
Rating of the level of security for 
e-Commerce systems
Small lowest risk lowest risk
Medium slightly higher risk highest risk
Large highest risk highest risk at the end of 2004
Table 5. Rating of the Level of Risk and Security for e-Commerce Systems  
Table 5 shows that all of the ratings of overall security for e-Commerce systems for each size grouping (see Table 1) are less 
than moderate, indicating that this could be improved.
Effective marketing of security to all managers and employees
This factor is directed at the WoG level. The entire project represents a consistent approach to security across government 
including:
• a top down approach (commitment at senior level); 
• appointing a central government agency to monitor the level of accreditation;
• a web based information resource (central government agency website) allowing information (including links to other 
resources) to be disseminated to all managers and employees;
• additional premier’s circulars;
• access to relevant standards;
• regular contact with agencies; via surveys, one-on-one interviews, emails; and
• forums (refer Smith and Jamieson, 2006).
Distribution of guidance on information security policy and standards to all employees and contractors
This factor was directed at the WoG and agency level. This factor included the previous success factor and the appointment 
of individual certification organizations to be engaged as consultants to assist the non-accredited agencies move towards 
accreditation, without the need for onerous documentation to appoint them.
Providing appropriate training and education;
This factor is directed at the WoG and agency level. This was achieved by the production of a video (title ‘I wish it wasn’t 
me !!)’ specifically targeted at government agencies. In addition in-house information sessions, induction training (included 
security policies), pamphlets, banners and other multimedia aids for security awareness, were produced and disseminated to
agencies.
A comprehensive and balanced system of measurement, which is used to evaluate performance in information 
security management and feedback suggestions for improvement.
This factor was directed at the WoG and agency level. This factor includes the previous success factor ‘(f)‘ and includes the 
WoG on-line security survey, forums, focus groups, interviews (both individual and group) and finally reporting to agencies 
and government on the progress of agencies security projects. This success factor is the accreditation of agencies to the 
security standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001.
CONCLUSION
The critical success factors for the security standard highlight a set of measures, which support the 10 control categories of 
Part 1 of the 2001 security standard (see Table 2). The CSF’s really define the factors that would assist this research and it 
has shown the factors that would assist agencies achieve certification. 
From a government agency perspective, the most important factor, which was mentioned at almost every government agency 
interview and frequently in the forum and focus group, was ‘senior management support’. Other issues include the 
development of security policies, plans and informed staff to understand the security requirements, risk assessment and 
management of their government agency.
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From a WoG perspective there were four main factors influencing the drive to improve security. The first was the Premier’s 
Circular PC2001-46, which established a government wide consistent approach to ISS management. The second was the use 
of Office of Information Communications and Technology (OICT) staff to effectively market the strategy to agencies and 
staff combined with providing guidance on information security policies. Thirdly, appropriate training and education was 
given via the video and group forums to provide an environment for government agency staff to be informed and raise 
concerns. Finally the development of a ‘system of measurement’ to evaluate the performance of security has been reflected in
this research - the on-line security survey in conjunction with our analysis gives a measure of the performance of information 
security management within agencies. 
The conclusion from the current survey and government agency contacts indicates that only four agencies have achieved the 
goal of AS/NZS17799.1:2001 (with 2004 amendment) compliance within the original target date of December 2004 and 
seven by December 2005 (note the due date for target compliance was extended until December 2006. Agency compliance at 
December 2006 is confidential).
The results were further validated externally by another government agency’s ISS survey. This research contributes to the 
level of understanding of ISS within the domain of e-Commerce within Government (e-Government). 
Further research could develop models, theories and undertake empirical research at the intersection of ISS and e-
Government to improve ISS management in government ICT practice.
IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The purpose of this study was to demonstrate an increase in compliance to security issues and the Australian Standard. This 
research has implications for governments who intend to progress towards ISS de jure standard accreditation. A limitation of 
‘question only’ survey analysis is the possibility of bias in answering the research question. Over time participants can get 
better at answering the questions giving the perception of a better security. To minimize this effect additional techniques were 
employed. First, by providing a benchmark of responses (for the feedback of the results of their agency survey when 
compared to other agencies), across agencies, this motivated participants to include the major areas (for example 
confidentiality, integrity and availability), within their organizations security policy and plans. Second, a series of one-on-one 
follow-up interviews conducted to verify the survey responses and finally the certification process was independent and 
covered all aspects of agencies ISS project.
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